Abstract: This paper considers the impact of the Constitutional Court on legislative output in Italy. Following Tsebelis ' (2002) veto players model and the stylised facts as regards the Italian Constitutional Court's activity, this paper presents a multi-stage game in the spirit of Gely and Spiller (1990) . In the first stage, the legislative veto players, namely the parties in government, choose whether to change or not the policy status quo by enacting new legislation. In the second stage, the Court makes a constitutional interpretation: it decides whether or not to alter the outcome of the first stage through a sentence of constitutional illegitimacy. The Court has both the power of annulling laws and a limited power of creating new legally binding norms. Moreover, in the third stage, a constitutional law voted by a parliamentary qualified majority can overturn the Court's decisions. The model predicts that the presence of the Court lowers legislative policy change and tests this prediction with 1956-2001 annual time series data for Italy.
Introduction
This paper studies the effect of the Constitutional Court on legislative output in Italy. The paper, by building on both Tsebelis ' (2002) veto players model and the separation-of-powers theory (see e.g. Gely and Spiller, 1990 , Ferejohn and Weingast, 1992 , and Spiller and Spitzer, 1992 , develops firstly a sequential rational choice model that tries to capture the stylised facts of the Italian constitutional review (see Cheli, 1999 , Rodotà, 1999 , Nardini, 2000 , and Rolla and Groppi, 2002 ; and second, by using cointegration techniques, it tests the predictions of the model on 1956-2001 annual data.
One of the most striking features of the Italian law making over the last fifty-five years has been both the steady decline in the amount of government-sponsored bills and total legislation approved by Parliament and the reduction in the proportion of government bills approved in parliamentary committees.
1 Kreppel (1997) argues that these features reflect the impact of an increase in the number of parties participating in government: according to Tsebelis ' (2002) veto players theory, increasing the number and ideological distance of government members makes it more difficult for the government to agree in passing significant legislation, which will result in legislative inertia. Kreppel (1997) finds empirical evidence supporting this prediction by using static OLS regression techniques on 1948-1987 annual data. Zucchini (2001) extends Kreppel's analysis up to 1995 and argues that, when dealing with government bills approved by committees, as long as this decentralized procedure requires unanimity voting in practice, 2 the relevant measure of veto players should be rather given by the number of effective parties in Parliament. 3 His static OLS regression results give support to the hypothesis that an increase in the number of effective 1 In the decade 1956-1965, the yearly average number of government-sponsored laws approved by the Camera dei deputati was 261.5 of which 68.5% passed directly in the committees; in the period 1986-1995, the yearly average was 174.3 laws of which 27.2% approved in committees, see also Newell (2000: 13-14) , and Giuliani (1997: 87-88) .
2 Either one fifth of the members of the commission, or the government's representative in the committee, or one tenth of the members of a house of Parliament can stop the decentralised law-making procedure, in which case the bill concerned is referred back to the plenary session. 3 The number of effective parties, or the Laakso-Taagapera index, is the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index, HH= parties lowers on average the number of government-sponsored legislative designs approved in committees over the period. This paper adds the Constitutional Court to the list of possible factors that may explain the steady decline of significant legislation in Italy. In particular, the paper will show that the very presence of the Court, which started to operate in Italy in 1956, had the effect of enlarging the Pareto set of policy alternatives that cannot be improved upon by the political veto players (see below).
The idea that constitutional courts may contribute to legislative inertia is not new: Gely and Spiller (1990) , for example, by focusing on statutory interpretation by the US Supreme Court, argue that a rational, politically motivated court will take the politicians' Pareto set as a constraint in its interpretative activity, thus producing sentences shifting policy equilibria towards points that politicians will be unable to overrule subsequently. More recently, Volcansek (2001) has argued that constitutional courts with the power of constitutional review can have either an indirect influence on the legislative process (i.e. through the politicians anticipated reactions of the Court's moves) or a direct influence on it (i.e. through the power of invalidating a law). Volcansek (2001) sees the Court as an additional veto player, alongside the executive and the legislative. This implies that, on the one hand, politicians will take the Court's preferences as a constraint and that, on the other hand, the Court will be able to act in coalition with one or the other veto player in order to sustain a particular policy equilibrium. 4 Albeit focusing on constitutional review, 5 this paper will not treat the Italian Constitutional Court as a "proper" veto player, because it will assume that the Court's ideal point is inside the political veto players' Pareto set (see also Tsebelis, 2002: cap 10) . However, given the qualified majority rule needed for "safely" approving a constitutional law (see Article 138 of the Constitution), the paper will treat the Court as a sort of "deputy" veto player in the ordinary lawmaking process: as long as the set of political veto players necessary to overrule the Court (i.e. the constitutional veto players) will in general be larger than the set of players needed for passing ordinary laws (i.e. the legislative veto players), the Court, by means of a credible threat of annulling legislation, will be able to prevent any ordinary legislative change that makes itself and at least one of the constitutional veto players worse off, (see below; and Gely and Spiller, 1992) . Moreover, the paper will assume that the Italian Court, a part from nullifying laws, has gained a limited power of positive legislation (i.e. of creating new legally binding norms): 6 strategic anticipation of this power may induce some legislative veto players not to agree to legislative changes that they would have supported in the Court's absence (see below).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of the interaction between the Constitutional Court and politicians, which builds on Tsebelis (2002), Spiller (1990, 1992) and Ferejohn and Weingast (1992) . Section 3 presents the empirical evidence as regards the Court's influence on the Italian legislative process by using annual time series data: section 3.1
shows that the existence of the Court in Italy since 1956 has lowered over the period 1956-1999 the number of government-sponsored legislative designs passed by the Camera dei deputati each year, which, following Kreppel (1997) , is taken as a proxy of significant legislative output, once controlling for other features of the political system, such as the number or ideological distance of veto players, the possibility for the Court of "positive legislation", the number of governments, and the electoral years. Section 3.2 shows that the same qualitative results are obtained when the dependent variable is measured as the total number of laws approved by Parliament over the period , net of the ratification of international treaties and of the laws with very limited temporal effects. Section 4 concludes with final remarks.
Veto players and the Constitutional Court: a basic model
In this section, we outline the basic model of the interaction between politicians and the Constitutional Court in Italy, by focusing on how the Court's activity of constitutional review may influence legislative production. This interaction is complicated by the fact that politicians may reverse a Constitutional Court's sentence either by modifying the Court's remit or by changing the Court's composition by means of a constitutional law.
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Article 138 of the Italian Constitution regulates constitutional law-making activity by Parliament. According to Article 138, if a constitutional law is not approved in second voting by a two-thirds qualified majority of members in each house of Parliament, it is possible to undo it by calling a popular referendum. This referendum is particularly risky for the supporters of the law in question, as long as it does not require a quorum. 8 Therefore, in the presence of a constitutional court, the rules governing the constitutional and the ordinary law-making process will be different and the constitutional veto players will in general be a larger set than the legislative ones (see below).
Following Tsebelis (2002: 140-172) , we identify the legislative veto players with the parties present in the Cabinet: these are the players whose unanimity agreement is needed in order to pass significant ordinary legislation. 9 The constitutional veto players include both the legislative veto players and any other party in the Parliament that is strictly necessary to approve a constitutional 7 See also Gely and Spiller (1992) for the US and Helmke (2002) for Argentina.
8 "Laws amending the Constitution and other constitutional laws shall be adopted by each House after two successive debates at intervals of no less than three months, and shall be approved by an absolute majority of the members of each House in the second voting. Said laws are submitted to a popular referendum when, within three months of their publication, such request is made by one-fifth of the members of a House, or five hundred thousand voters, or five Regional Councils. The law submitted to referendum shall not be promulgated if not approved by a majority of valid votes. A referendum shall not be held if the law has been approved in the second voting by each of the Houses by a majority of two-thirds of the members", Article 138 of the Constitution. (Emphasis added.) 9 The arguments supporting this assumption are well known: firstly, the government's parties usually enjoy an agenda setting power with respect to Parliament, even in the case of minority governments. In particular, if they are centrally located in the policy space and if the Parliament's amendments powers are limited, the government parties will be able to move the status quo inside their Pareto set. Second, they can directly endanger the government's life, even when they are not strictly necessary to pass new legislation, as in the case of oversized coalitions.
law with the qualified majority of Article 138: in Italy, until 1992, this majority was always achieved by adding the main opposition party to the government parties (see section 3 below).
The interaction between the Court and the Parliament may be thought of as a three stage game involving sequentially both the legislative veto players, the Court and the constitutional veto players:
Stage t1. The legislative veto players choose whether or not they want to change the existing status quo by ordinary legislation.
Stage t2. The Court chooses whether or not it wants to change the status quo by means of sentencing.
Stage t3. The constitutional veto players decide whether or not to overrule the Court's decision by a constitutional law.
At each stage, each player has complete information and fully anticipates the moves of the other players in subsequent stages.
This sequence of events reflects the features of constitutional review in Italy, where, coeteris paribus, it takes more time for the Court than for politicians to change the status quo in a preferred direction: in particular, under the so called incidental review (i.e. certified question), before the Court can try to modifying an existing law, it is always necessary a trial and a judge who recognizes that the issue of constitutionality is not groundless. 10 It also amounts to assuming that the constitutional veto players have formally the last word in the process of policy change:
11 10 Incidental review represents about 80% of the Court's activity, see Rolla and Groppi (2002) . Similarly, the US Supreme Court intervenes when one of the parties in trial notifies the Court about the constitutionality of a law still in force. On the contrary, the French Constitutional Court can directly veto any law approved by the Parliament. Our analysis cannot be easily extended to other activities by the Italian Court, such as principal review regulating conflicts of interest between government levels (see Breton and Fraschini, 2003 Figure 1 , the three legislative veto players will prefer any point in the gray area (delimited by the three indifference curves of A, B and C passing through SQ) to SQ itself: the gray area represents the winset of the status quo SQ. The (unspecified here) rules of the bargaining game and the amount of transaction costs will determine which equilibrium will be selected within this area.
[Figure 1 in here]
Suppose now that there is a Constitutional Court, that we denote with G in Figure 1 .
Irrespective of the Court's position in policy space, as long as the legislative veto players do not command a two-thirds qualified majority in Parliament, the set of players whose unanimity agreement is needed to overrule a Court's sentence by a constitutional law is larger than the 12 The "fair trail act" is an example of a constitutional law overruling a Court's sentence. In 1997 the Italian Parliament modified the criminal law as regards the "collaboratore di giustizia" (i.e. criminal turned grass). In 1998, the Court declared the new law unconstitutional and the Parliament reacted by swiftly approving under qualified majority a constitutional law ("the fair trial act") introducing the same specific rules included in the nullified statute, see Grosso (2001: 473-80 ). The Court did not react to this law.
legislative veto players' set: the "constitutional" veto players' Pareto set is the area ABCD, which includes-together with the legislative veto players A,B, C-also the main opposition party D.
In Figure 1 process makes it very unlikely that extreme or minority positions will be represented within the Court or that they will correspond to those of a particular political veto player: it is likely that the Court (or its median member when applicable) will be centrally located in policy space.
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The Constitutional Court lowers legislative change, by increasing the number of veto players
What are the implications of this model's representation for the ordinary law-making activity? From Figure 1 , it is clear that any status quo change preferred by the legislative veto players at stage t1 of the game that makes the Court worse off would be definitively reversed by an illegitimacy sentence 13 This assumption is standard in the separation-of-power literature: for example, Ferejohn and Weingast (1992: 268) define the Court as an "unconstrained policy advocate". Moreover, for Italy, it is consistent with judicial experts' assessment. Cheli (1999: 33) , a former constitutional judge, argues that the Court's preferences are given by the Constitution and that "notwithstanding the variety of its technical and political derivations, [the Court] tends to show a strong cultural homogeneity within its ranks, due to the level of formation and experience of its members". Note that the Court's members must be chosen among legal experts: magistrates from the higher courts, tenured law professors, and lawyers with at least twenty years of experience (see Article 135 of the Constitution). Moreover, the Court's decisions are taken collectively, and there is no record of the voting patterns for the single judges (unlikely, e.g., in the USA).
14 The two-thirds majority of members of Parliament must be reached on the first three ballots, after which a three-fifth majority is required, see Article 135 of the Constitution and the Constitutional law n. 87, 11/03/1953, art. 2.
15 "An allocation among the political parties that was recognised since 1956 provided that of the five appointments by parliament two are for the Christian Democrats, one for the Socialists, one for the Communists and one rotates among the three centre lay parties: those of the head of state generally followed the same division…This formula was not broken until 1994…Thereafter, appointments to the Court informally seemed to alternate, with one to the left and the next to the right", Volcansek (2001: 356) . Note that US Supreme Court justices are appointed by the President for life, which makes it more likely that the Court's preferences are outside the politicians' Pareto set, see Gely and Spiller (1990: 12; 1992: 47 Pareto set, should be associated with more "policy stability" in Italy, namely with a lower ability by the legislative veto players to changing significantly the status quo through ordinary legislation.
The Constitutional Court lowers legislative policy change, for a given number of veto players, when it has a positive power of legislation
However, this is not the only channel through which the Italian Court can influence the ordinary law-making process. To illustrate this point more sharply, assume that the constitutional majority corresponds with the ordinary majority, such that the constitutional and the legislative veto players'
Pareto set is given by the area ABCD in Figure 1 above. Clearly, in this case, the mechanism previously outlined is absent. Still the Constitutional Court can affect the legislative output by an alternative route.
As pointed out firstly by Spiller (1990, 1992) , if a Constitutional Court is able to move the status quo in a preferred direction, namely if it is free to choose in principle any point in policy space through its sentences, it will select its preferred policy outcome subject to the politicians' Pareto set (in Figure 1 , this choice would correspond to the Court's ideal point G), 19 such that the political veto players (ABCD in Figure 1 ) will be unable to make any further move and will simply accept the Court's decision. In other words, the presence of a Constitutional Court brings legislative production close to zero and stage t1 of the game becomes redundant for describing the strategic interaction between the Court and politicians.
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The ability of a Constitutional Court to "positive legislation" (i.e. to create new legally binding norms) is usually associated in the literature with statutory interpretation. When it comes to constitutional interpretation, it is more often assumed that the Court can only accept or reject the status quo resulting from a veto players' decision. 21 In this case, the Court's presence will not necessarily reduce legislative activity: in the example of Figure 1 , the legislative veto players anticipate at stage t1 that the Court will accept any status quo change making it no worse off (say from SQ to SQ1 in Figure 1 ) and therefore they will agree in producing such a legislative change without the fear of being stopped by the Court subsequently.
Although the Italian Constitutional Court only deals with constitutional interpretation, over the years the Court has developed various interpretative techniques allowing it a limited power of positive legislation, a part from its power of negative legislation. For example, by means of the so called "additive judgements", the Court can de facto create legal rules by declaring a law unconstitutional "to the extent that it lacks a constitutionally required rule", and then "effectively insert[ing] the missing rule into the statute". 22 We interpret this power of positive legislation similarly to an intermediate amendment rule (limited amendment power) by the legislature: because the Court writes sentences, not laws, it will be more constrained than legislators in its ability to change the status quo in a preferred direction. In Figure 1 , the Court's ideal point G is inside the veto players' Pareto set, but outside the winset of SQ for A, B, C and D (i.e. the gray area). This means that the policy outcome G makes at least one veto player (here A and C) worse off relative to the original status quo SQ: by 22 "For example, in 1970 and 1972 the Court held a criminal defence counsel statute unconstitutional to the extent that it did not permit counsels to be present during critical pretrial events such as interrogation of the defendant and deposition of adverse witness". Although such a norm appeared in no legal text, according to the Court the code of criminal procedure embodied it. "As a practical matter, the effect of this judgment was to 'add' a provision permitting counsels to attend pretrial events", Nardini (2002: 19-23 ), see also Rolla and Groppi (2002) on additive judgements.
23 Ruggeri and Spadaro (1998: 229) point out that "there is a fundamental difference between the activity of a supreme judge and of a legislator: while this latter can, if it wishes to do so, bluntly contradict itself by overruling its past decisions, thanks to its "political nature", in so far as these new decisions are "reasonable", the Court must always renew itself in small steps, gradually, by maintaining a substantial coherence with its past rulings. This is because the Court is, in its essence, a judge and therefore its acts are jurisdictional: when the Court is called to constitutional interpretation, the Court must be, so to speak, "predictable", it must provide "certainties of law" rather than producing acts of government that respond to changeable or immediate conveniences." (Original quote in Italian). 24 The government, by anticipating the possibility that the Court will rule against specific parts of an ordinary law it has proposed, often prefers to modify such a law beforehand, see Zucchini (1999) for the case of the immigration law n.40/1997 ("Legge Turco-Napolitano"). A similar behaviour has been observed in Germany and has been dubbed "Karlsruhe astrology" (Karlsruhe being the city were the Federal Constitutional Court seats), see Volcansek (2001: 349) and the references therein cited. The mechanism presented here is a possible explanation for complete inaction by legislators.
construction, the distance ||G-A||, say, is greater than the distance ||SQ-A||. Note that, because the Court's preferences are Euclidean, the shortest distance from SQ to G is the straight line SQG.
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If the Court has a limited power of positive legislation, at stage t2 it will be able to move partially the status quo towards its ideal point G. If the stage t1 status quo is SQ, the Court can maybe travel to SQ'; however, if the stage t1 status quo has been moved to SQ1, the Court can maybe shift the policy equilibrium to G. At stage t1 of the game, A will anticipate the Court's incentives at stage t2, and will decide whether or not to agree in changing the status quo from SQ to SQ1. Clearly, if A is only concerned about the final outcome, it will never agree in a legislative change at stage t1, insofar it anticipates that this will make the Court able to shift the final equilibrium to G, where A is worse off relatively to SQ. Otherwise, if A is also interested in temporary payoffs and if it discounts sufficiently heavily future payoffs, A will compare the expected utility from agreeing with that from not agreeing at stage t1, and will decide consequently. 26 However, strategic anticipation of the Court's incentive is likely to make ordinary legislative change less likely, especially if one also takes into account the costs of policy change through law-production (e.g. in terms of the time spent in negotiating the text of law, the opportunity cost of using parliamentary time, the electoral cost of overlooking the constituency service and so on). This kind of interaction drives both players (i.e. the Constitutional Court and A) in a Pareto inferior situation, similarly to a Prisoner's dilemma.
The analysis of this section suggests that the Constitutional Court may have contributed in different ways to legislative inaction in Italy: firstly, because of the qualified majority required to overrule a Court's illegitimacy sentence, the number of constitutional veto players is larger than the number of legislative veto players, which implies an increase in the size of the Pareto set of points 25 We could obtain qualitatively similar results, if we assumed that the Court can change the status quo along one dimension only, e.g. the Court can only affect the status quo as regards issue 1 in Figure 1 . Such a limitation is quite common in policy areas involving both distributive and financial dimensions: for the Italian Court is much easier to move the status quo along the distributive dimension than along the financial one, see Nardini (2000: 20-21) . 26 In this example, at stage t1 A will always refuse to change the status quo from SQ to SQ1, even if the Court can shift the equilibrium to SQ' by its sentencing at stage t2, see Appendix 1
that cannot be improved upon by ordinary legislation; second, strategic anticipation of the Court's incentives by the legislative veto players may also enlarge such a Pareto set, and this effect may be related to the ability of positive legislation by the Court. From the analysis of this section, we derive the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis. The presence of the Constitutional Court in Italy is likely to lower significant legislative output approved by Parliament, namely to increase the policy stability: a) by increasing the number of relevant veto players, coeteris paribus; b) by strategic anticipation of legislative veto players, provided that the Court has some power to create new legal rules by its sentences.
The Constitutional Court and legislative output in Italy (1956-2001)
The Italian Constitutional Court starts to operate in 1956. In order to test our Hypothesis, we consider annual data for the period 1956-2001. We now describe the variables used in the empirical analysis: descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1 below together with Figure 1 , plotting the time series in levels and first differences.
[ Table 1 in here]
[Figure 2 in here]
Legislative output: As a dependent variable, we firstly use the total number of governmentsponsored bills proposed by the government and approved by the Camera dei deputati each year, divided by 100 (denoted by Laws/100). Following Kreppel (1997) and Zucchini (2001), we take this as a proxy for the "significant laws" considered by Tsebelis (2002) as an index of policy change. 27 As any other alternative, this measure is not without its drawbacks: firstly, we are assuming implicitly that the structure of the legislative production holds stable, namely that the annual density distribution of government's laws in terms of importance is always the same.
However, this assumption seems problematic for the more recent Italian legislatures. After the collapse of the so called First Republic (1948 Republic ( -1992 , the number of delegation laws has increased steadily. By means of these laws, the Parliament formally empowers the government to emanate decrees in many important policy areas according to an approved general framework. Therefore, the same or a bigger amount of policy change that before 1992 could have been produced by many ordinary laws, lately could be made by using the delegation laws, numerically less but much more important in their impact on the status quo. Unfortunately, no reliable information about the number of delegation laws is available before the X Legislature (namely, before 1987), and we cannot consider them separately in our analysis.
Secondly, we are assuming that the stock of laws in force does not affect the number of laws necessary for a significant policy change. We do not know of any research dealing directly with this issue. As long as there are good a priori arguments to believe that a large stock either reduces or increases this number, we altogether ignore this potential objection in our analysis.
Finally, we exclude from our sample the data for the years 2000 due to technical reasons:
since that year, the data source we use until 1999 (i.e. Notiziario della Camera dei deputati) has been disconnected and the data the research staff of the Camera dei deputati have been collecting
are not comparable anymore with the previous ones.
As an alternative dependent variable, covering the period 1956-2001, we use the total number of laws approved by Parliament, net of the ratification of international treaties, divided by 100 (denoted by Lex/100). These data are collected from the Iuris database, one of the most important digital archives of Italian laws that includes all laws published in Italy since the birth of the Country (1861), excluding only the micro-legislation very limited in its temporal effects. This proxy variable has some advantages and disadvantages compared to the previous one. Firstly, we do not have to deal with the international treaties 28 that are usually bills resulting from a completely different political game, where the parliamentary actors do not play any role. Moreover, we can include the laws not sponsored by the government, but that had a significant impact on policy:
actually some very important laws approved by the Italian Parliament, such as for instance the laws about divorce (n. 898/1970) and abortion (n. 194/1978) , were not sponsored by the government.
However, although micro-legislation very limited in its temporal effects is excluded from our data, many other irrelevant laws coming from private bills are likely to be still included in the data set.
Size of the veto players' Pareto set. According to Tsebelis (2002) , the larger is the size of the veto players' Pareto set, the bigger will be the area of policy stability, the lower will be legislative output, coeteris paribus. Therefore, we need to identify both the veto players of the ordinary legislative process in Italy and the way to better proxy the size of their Pareto set.
Tsebelis (2002) and Kreppel (1997) define the veto players as the parties in government, namely the legislative veto players. However, the analysis of section 2 above suggests that the presence of a qualified majority requirement for political overruling of a Court's sentence of constitutional interpretation has enlarged the set of relevant veto players in Italy. These constitutional veto players are given by the parties in government plus any other party necessary to achieve the two-thirds qualified majority in Parliament. As it turns out, a part from the years 1995-1998, the constitutional veto players are given by the sum of the government parties plus the main opposition party. 29 Even when the Christian Democrats were the only party in government during the First Republic, the agreeement with the Communist party was a necessary and sufficient condition to reach such a qualified majority. However, when we had an oversized government, we still count the other minor legislative veto players, as they could influence the constitutional review by endangering the government's life. Note that, following Tsebelis' approach, we do not count as legislative veto players the parties supporting the government by a confidence vote, but that were not directly involved in the Cabinet, unless they were necessary to reach the two-thirds majority.
Following Tsebelis and Chang's (2002) methodology, we approximate the ideological distance between the most extreme parties forming a constitutional majority (i.e. the range of the constitutional veto players) by using two of the policy scales computed for each party by Laver and Hunt (1992: 234-39) and updated by Battaglin (1998) for Italy on the basis of experts' assessment, and then by calculating their yearly average. In particular, we use the policy scale "promoting raising taxes to increasing public services" (score 1) versus "promoting cutting public services to cutting taxes" (score 20) and the policy scale "pro permissive social policy " (score 1) and "anti permissive social policy" (score 20) positions. 30 We calculate in the same way also the ideological distance between the most extreme parties in government according to the original Tsebelis'
hypothesis.
Constitutional Court dummy variable. The analysis of section 2 suggests that the Court, a part from enlarging the Pareto set, may have contributed to reduce legislative output by inducing strategic anticipation by part of the legislative veto players. Strategic anticipation may be particularly important when the Court is not only able to nullify laws, but when it can create new norms through its sentences. We do not have any obvious empirical proxy for measuring the Court's ability to affect positively the policy status quo and how it has changed since 1956.
However, the analysis of the Court's history (see e.g. Bonini, 1996 and Rodotà, 1999) Laver and Hunt (1992) produce eight policy scales, scored by the experts in terms of their saliency for each party.
Because the original research design was comparative (it covered 23 democracies), for each country some policy scales were highly correlated by in fact referring to a few common ideological dimensions. Moreover, because Laver and Hunt's main goal was testing the performance of alternative models regarding government coalition building, the data are time-invariant and only refer to the parties' positions at the end the Eighties. Despite all of these drawbacks, we have decided to use cautiously these data for the period 1956-1993 and the data very similarly collected by Battaglin (1998) for the period 1994-2001, namely for the so called Second Republic. Under the constraint of data availability, we have selected the two policy scales that were reciprocally uncorrelated, salient and that, to our knowledge, showed the least variance of the party positions over each period. For the first policy scale, the experts were asked to locate the positions of party leaders as regards the issue of "promoting raising taxes to increasing public services" (score 1) versus "promoting cutting public services to cutting taxes" (score 20). The extreme points for the second scale are the "pro choice in abortion, euthanasia and homosexuality " (score 1) and "anti choice in abortion, euthanasia and homosexuality" (score 20) positions.
have permitted the Court to accepting only partially a constitutional challenge with reference to some articles, sections of phrases included in the statutes, or to declaring a law invalid to the extent that it lacked a constitutionally required rule, or even to the extent that it provided for a particular rule rather than for another one (the so called "sentenze additive" and "sentenze sostitutive"): in other words, the Court's has developed since 1965 and over the years its ability to create new legally binding norms (see Ruggeri and Spadaro, 1988: 204-211 Other control variables. As control variables, we include one election year variable (taking the value of one in each election year and in 1974, and zero otherwise) and the average number of governments per year. Both variables are likely to affect our proxy for legislative output negatively.
In particular, during an election year, the government and Parliament devote time and effort to the election campaign, which should reduce legislative activity accordingly (see Kreppel, 1997) . Note that 1974 was not an election year, but a referendum year: a popular referendum was called in May   1974 for the abrogation of the divorce law. Because much time and effort were devoted in 1974, especially by the pivotal Christian Democracy (DC) government party, firstly in order to require the referendum, and then to fight the referendum campaign, we believe that 1974 should be treated similarly to an election year.
The empirical model
Data analysis suggests that the time series may not be stationary: as is well known, if this is the case, OLS estimates are likely to be biased and inconsistent and can lead to spurious correlation results. Table 2 below (see also Figure 2 above) reports the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for the variables of interest in levels and first differences over the period 1956-2001. 31 These tests cannot reject unambiguously the null hypothesis that the alternative proxy measures for legislative output (i.e. the number of government-sponsored legislative bills, Laws/100, and the number of total bills net of the ratification of international treaties. Lex/100) and the alternative proxies for the size of the Pareto set (i.e. number and ideological distance of constitutional and of legislative veto players)
are non-stationary, integrated to order one or I(1) variables (see in particular the no constant, no trend ADF test in Table 2 ). The number of governments variable is instead likely to be a stationary series.
[ Table 2 in here]
As long as both non-stationary series are integrated to the same order, and given that our theory suggests that the size of the Pareto set and the number of governments are weakly exogenous In the equation above, the lagged values of both the dependent variable and of the alternative proxies for the size of the Pareto set allow us to avoid misspecification dynamics. Alternatively, 31 Following the sequential testing procedure, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test was used for testing down from the drift plus trend model, to the no drift, no trend model. As is well known, the ADF test in its general form consists in of the variance in our data) and lower standard error of the regression, coeteris paribus (compare columns 1 and 2 for numbers; 3 and 4 for ideological distance); the regressions with the Court dummy and either the number or ideological distance of constitutional veto players do not show clear differences in performance (see columns 5 and 6).
[ the regression with the ideological distance between constitutional veto players, but not with their number. By comparing columns 1 and 2, and 3 and 4 of Table 3 .2, note again that the equations with the constitutional veto players outperform those with the legislative veto players: for example, the long-run standard error of the regression is reduced by 16.8% when using the number of constitutional rather than legislative veto players and by 20% when using the ideological distance between constitutional rather than legislative veto players. We take this result as evidence supporting our hypothesis that the presence of the Court has reduced legislative output by increasing the size of the veto players' Pareto set.
Two further things are worthy noticing: firstly, our estimates suggest that, if starting at mean values, a 1% increase in the number of constitutional veto players will lead to a reduction in the total number of government-sponsored laws approved by the Camera dei deputati by 0.41%; the long-run elasticity of the total number of laws with respect to the ideological distance of constitutional veto players is instead estimated to be almost unitary (i.e. equal to 1.07), if starting at mean values. Second, we do not find overwhelming evidence supporting our hypothesis that the possibility for the Court to affect the status quo positively since 1965 had a negative effect on legislative output: although the Court dummy variable turns out to be negatively signed, as expected, it is only statistically significant at the 5% level when we use it together with the ideological distance of constitutional veto players, but it is insignificant with the number of constitutional veto players instead (p-value: 12%).
[ Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) critical values: the coefficient on the lagged error correction term from the long-run estimates (Ecm-1), measuring the speed of convergence to the long-run, is always quite large (at least 98% of any disequilibrium from the long run value of Laws/100 is eliminated each year), implying that the behaviour of our dependent variable in the short-run is dominated by the long-run, so the dynamics have little effect. 35 Matter of factly, changes in the number of the constitutional veto players are unable to explain the short-run dynamics of legislative output: only changes between election and non election years and, at least partially, changes in the ideological distance seems to explain its year by year fluctuations.
[ Tables 3.3 Table 4 .2 columns 4 and 6 (note that both equations pass the PcGive unit root test for cointegration). Moreover, in this latter case the Court dummy variable has the expected negative sign and it is statistically significant.
[Table 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 in here]
The short-run dynamics, described by Table 4 .2); 37 moreover, the significant Court dummy variable corresponding to years when the Court has positive power of legislation seems to support our hypothesis that strategic anticipation by the legislative veto players may have had a further dumpening effect on law production.
Discussion
The data of our statistical models are not univocal, as they reflect also the differences in the dependent variables used. Some results seem very strong, others should have to be investigated further. Our testable hypothesis concerned two potential channels of influence by part of the Constitutional Court on the Italian legislative output. We also measured the size of the Pareto set in alternative ways, namely by the number of the veto players or by their ideological distance in two dimensions.
Our first hypothesis was that the Italian Constitutional Court has enlarged the set of relevant veto players, making the so called constitutional veto players a better explanans than the parties in government of Tsebelis (2002) and Kreppel (1997) . This hypothesis is always confirmed by our data, it does not matter the type of dependent variable is used and the way the veto players' Pareto set is measured.
According when the dependent variable is the number of government-sponsored laws, COURTD65 is marginally significant only when we use it together with the ideological distance of constitutional veto players. If the dependent variable is the total number of laws net of international treaties, COURTD65 performs relatively better than previously and still quite well with the ideological distance of constitutional veto players. We are aware that the way we implemented empirically the anticipation effect is quite rough. The Court has probably improved progressively its positive power of legislation over a long period and not immediately after a date. However, all things considered, we believe that we have found some evidence of the strategic anticipation effect.
Finally, according Tsebelis and Chang (2002) , the ideological distance in two dimensions approximates the size of the Pareto set better than the number of veto players and should have a stronger explicative power. We find out the same qualitative result only when using the total number of laws net of international treaties as a dependent variable. Partly, this result may be due to fact that we do not have a genuine time-series variable for the ideological distance in multidimensional space.
Conclusions
This paper has considered the impact of the Constitutional Court on legislative policy change in Italy. The relationship between politicians and the Court has been represented by a three-stage game, involving sequentially the legislative veto players (namely, the parties in government), the Court and the constitutional veto players (namely, the parties in government plus the main opposition party). Differently from previous works on "rational" judicial politics, we have allowed also for the possibility that the Court has both a negative power of legislation and a limited positive 
The expected utility from agreeing is given by the (undiscounted) sum of A's payoffs at stage t1, VA(SQ1), plus its payoff at stages t2 and t3, 2VA(G): this is because, at stage t1 A agrees in moving the status quo to SQ1, whereas at stage t2 the Court can move the policy equilibrium from SQ1 to its ideal point G, which the veto players cannot then overrule at stage t3. The expected utility from not agreeing is given by VA(SQ), A's payoff at stage t1, plus VA(SQ'), A's payoff at stage t2 given that the Court has changed the status quo by sentencing, plus VA(SQ'), A's payoff at stage 3. It is easy to see that A will agree in changing the status quo SQ providing the gain in utility from agreeing at stage t1 is greater than or equal to the sum of the gains in utility from not agreeing at stages t2 and t3, namely, if and only if: 
Clearly, the above expression is never satisfied when VA(SQ1)=VA(SQ) and VA(SQ')>VA(G), as being assumed here: player A will not agree in changing the status quo SQ at stage t1, whereas it would have agreed in changing it both in the absence of the Court and had the Court been free to choose any point in the policy space (equivalent to assuming VA(SQ')=VA(G) in this example). 
TABLES

Legenda
Laws/100: yearly number of government-sponsored legislative designs approved by the Camera dei Deputati, divided by 100.
Lex/100: yearly number of laws approved by Parliament net of ratification of international treaties, divided by 100.
Constitutional VPS: yearly average number of constitutional veto players, i.e. parties necessary to form a constitutional majority of two-thirds in Parliament.
Ideology Constitutional VPS: yearly ideological distance between the two most extreme constitutional veto players.
Legislative VPS: yearly average number of legislative veto players, i.e. parties in government.
Ideology Legislative VPS: yearly ideological distance between the two most extreme legislative veto players.
Court D65: dummy variable =1 for 1966-2001; =0 otherwise.
Election Years: variable =1 in all election years (1948, 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001) and in the divorce referendum year (1974); =0 otherwise.
Data Sources:
Legislative output: for Law/100 Camera dei deputati "Compendio statistico dalla I alla XII legislatura" 1948 XII legislatura" -1996 www.parlamento.it; for Lex/100 Iuris Data.
Number of Legislative Veto players: www.polisci.ucla/edu/tsebelis 1948-1992; www.cronologia.it/governi3.htm 1993-2001 .
Number of Constitutional Veto players: our calculation.
Ideological distance of veto players: our calculation based for 1948-1993 on Laver and Hunt (1992) , Italy, - Error correction test -3.6808** -4.2495** -3.5394* -4.1738** Note: White's heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Error correction test based on the t-ratio of the ECM-1 coefficient: Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) critical values (Table 3) . See also 
